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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID WHYTE, DAVID B. WHYTE, 
DAN E. WHYTE, and TERRY WHYTE, 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents. 
vs. 
DERL CHRISTENSEN and 
MRS. DERL CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Case No. 14151 
APPELLANTS1 BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Appellants, Deri Christensen and Mrs. Deri Christensen, 
appeal from a jury verdict and from a judgment entered upon the verdict 
entered therein. 
The action involved a claim by respondent, David Whyte, for 
labor and materials furnished by him and for the labor of respondents, 
David B. Whyte, Dan E. Whyte and Terry Whyte, procured by respondent, 
David Whyte, pursuant to an agreement between respondent, David Whyte, 
and appellants for construction of an addition to appellants1 home. 
In a second cause of action respondents, David B. Whyte, Dan E. 
Whyte, and Terry Whyte, claimed to be entitled to recover for labor 
supplied by them in the improvement of appellants' home in that appellants 
had not required respondent, David Whyte, to furnish a bond to insure 
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payment of those furnishing their labor for the improvement of appellants1 
property. 
Appellants counterclaimed against respondent, David Whyte, 
for any amount found to be due laborers or materialmen from appellants, 
claiming payment by appellants to respondent, David Whyte, of the full 
contract price. 
In a second cause of action in the counterclaim, appellants 
claimed damages from respondent, David Whyte, for failure to perform 
the work done upon appellants1 home in a workmanlike manner. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury in the Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County before the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, District Court Judge. 
From a verdict and a judgment rendered upon the verdict in favor of 
respondents (plaintiffs below), the appellants (defendants below) appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek a reversal of the Judgment entered by the 
trial court and costs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, Deri Christensen, and respondent, David Whyte, are 
long time employees of the United States Postal Service, becoming acquainted 
with each other some fifteen years ago through their employment. Respon-
dent, David Whyte, had been a job supervisor of appellant, Deri Christensen, 
at the Postal Service and the two were in daily contact with each other 
at their place of employment. 
Through their Postal Service acquaintance, appellant, Deri 
Christensen, became aware of respondent, David Whyte, doing carpentry 
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and home building work, and respondent, David Whyte, became aware of 
an addition which appellant, Deri Christensen, wished to make to his 
home located in the southwest part of Salt Lake County. 
In the summer of 1973, according to the testimony of respondent, 
David Whyte, (R-5), or in May of 1973, according to the testimony of 
appellant, Deri Christensen (R-125), the respondent and his wife met 
with the appellants at the home of the appellants in the Granger area 
of Salt Lake County. At this meeting at the home of the appellants, the 
addition to appellants1 home was discussed together with the cost of 
the addition. 
According to the version of respondent, David Whyte, the 
appellant, Deri Christensen, requested a rough idea as to the cost of 
the home addition, and respondent, David Whyte, mentioned the area of 
$6,000.00 (R-7). The version of appellant, Deri Christensen, was that 
the coat of the addition quoted by respondent, David Whyte, was $5,500.00 
(R-127). 
At the meeting at appellants1 home during which the wife of 
respondent, David Whyte, was present, the matter of labor was discussed 
(R-9, 10, 128, 129, 130). Both respondent, David Whyte, and appellant, 
Deri Christensen, were in agreement that the three sons of respondent, 
David Whyte, would be used to h£lp respondent, David Whyte, although 
no rate of compensation for the three sons was discussed. Pay for the 
labor of respondent, David Whyte, was understood to be at the rate equal 
to his hourly rate of pay at the Salt Lake Post Office, which respondent, 
David Whyte, pegged at $7.00 per hour (R-9), but which appellant, Deri 
Christensen, denied (R-129). 
Respondent, David Whyte, was an experienced home builder with 
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some 42 years of building experience (R-42), having built two complete 
homes for himself (R-42) and having had extensive building experience 
for others (R-43), but he was not a licensed contractor (R-3 and 143). 
Appellant, Deri Christensen, had no building experience and 
even received instruction from respondent, David Whyte, in obtaining a 
building permit for the addition that was to be made to appellants1 
home (R-13 9). 
The house addition project got underway in September, 1973, and 
was concluded in January, 1974 as per the summary of respondent, David 
Whyte, outlined in Exhibits P-1 and P-2, which were prepared by respon-
dent, David Whyte, in anticipation of trial (R-51,52 and 54). 
In addition to the house addition, some cement and block were 
provided to partially construct a garage and some cement ,was provided 
to make a floor for a storage shed. 
Respondent, David Whyte, contacted all of those in the building 
trades who performed specialty services in the remodel of appellants1 
home; e.g. the heating man (R-76), the electrician (R-90 and 91), the 
plumber (R-103) and the floor covering man (R-159 and 160). 
Respondent, David Whyte, selected the materials that went into 
the addition to appellants1 home (R-159). 
Billing for all materials and services going into the addition 
to appellants1 home went to respondent, David Whyte, who presented the 
bills to appellant, Deri Christensen, for payment (R-142 and 143). 
The first billing of appellant, Deri Christensen, by respondent, 
David Whyte, was for the sum of $1,230.75 and included all materials 
and labor to September 27, 1973 (Exhibit D-4). The sum of $1,230.75 
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was paid by appellant, Deri Christensen, to respondent, David Whyte 
(R-130 and 131). 
The second billing of appellant, Deri Christensen, by respondent, 
David Whyte, was for the sum of $1,609.36 and included materials and 
labor to November 4, 1973 (Exhibit D-5 and R-132). The sum of $1,609.36 
was paid by appellant, Deri Christensen, to respondent, David Whyte 
(R-133). 
In December, 1973 appellant, Deri Christensen, paid the sum of 
$561.40 to respondent, David Whyte, for materials furnished by Anderson 
Lumber Company (R-64). 
After the addition to appellants1 home was completed in 
January, 1973, respondent, David Whyte, submitted a final bill (Exhibit 
D-6, R-118, 134, and 135), in a total amount of $4,001.72* to appellant, 
Deri Christensen. Appellant, Deri Christensen, objected to the bill as 
being too high and refused to pay. 
Appellants, before the filing of respondents1 complaint June 18, 
1974, had paid for all materials, labor and services that had been 
supplied in constructing the addition to appellants1 home, except for the 
billing for the labor of respondents as shown upon Exhibit D-6. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED 
DEFENDANTS f (APPELLANTS f) MOTION FOR 
A DIRECTED VERDICT AT THE CLOSE OF 
PLAINTIFFS1 (RESPONDENTS1) EVIDENCE. 
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Did the evidence show that respondent, David Whyte, was 
a contractor who was contracting without a contractor's license? 
58-23-1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, provides 
as follows: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, ... to engage in the 
business or act in the capacity of contractor within this 
state without having a license therefor as herein provided, 
unless such person ••. in this act. Evidence of the 
securing of any construction or building permit from a 
governmental agency, or the employment of any person on a 
construction project, or the offering of any bid to do 
the work of a contractor as herein defined, shall be 
accepted in any court of the State of Utah as .prima facie 
evidence of engaging in the business or acting in the 
capacity of a contractor." (Emphasis added) 
Respondent, David Whyte, admittedly did not have a contractor's 
license (Pv-3). If respondent, David Whyte, was a contractor, and not 
an employee of appellants as contended by him, then his contract with 
appellants for the labor of himself and the other respondents is void 
so as to preclude his recovery for said labor. Qlsen v. Reese, 114 Utah 
411, 200 P2d 733. 
But was respondent, David Whyte, a contractor? Or was 
respondent, David Whyte, an employee of appellants? 58-23-3 (3), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, gives the following definition: 
"Contractor: Any person, ..., who for a fixed sum, price, fee, 
percentage or other compensation other than wages, undertakes with 
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another for the construction, alteration, repair, addition to or 
improvement of any building, ... any part thereof; provided, that 
the term contractor, as used in this act ... and shall include 
subcontractor, but shall not include anyone who merely furnishes 
materials or supplies without fabricating the same into, or consuming 
the same in the performance of the work of the contractors as herein 
defined. The term contractor ... incidental in their nature.ff 
In Strieker v. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah 603, 188 P 849, the 
terms "employee" and "independent contractor" are defined as follows: 
"An employee is one who works for and under the control of another for 
hire." "An independent contractor is one who, exercising an independent 
employment, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own 
methods and without being subject to the control of his^employer 
except as to the result of the work." 
In the instant case, it is conceded by respondent, David 
Whyte, that appellant, Deri Christensen, had no building experience 
(R-56 and 57). The addition to appellants1 home was discussed between 
appellant, Deri Christensen, and respondent, David Whyte, as was the 
cost of the addition, and respondent, David Whyte, and his wife, made 
a trip to appellants' home to get an idea of the addition that appellants 
wanted made to their home. It is interesting to note that respondent, 
David Whyte, was the person who hired the other respondents; that it 
was him who made contact with those providing specialty services 
and materials; that he selected the materials to be used; that it was 
under his supervision that the materials were fabricated into the 
addition to appellants1 home; that all bills to be paid came to him 
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and not appellants; that his employer was the United States Postal Service; 
that for tax purposes he considered himself Mself employed"; that his work 
upon the addition to appellants1 home was at his own convenience; that 
cost of the total addition and not just that of labor was discussed with 
appellants; and it was him who supplied the tools and the "know-how" 
to get the job done. 
Respondent, David Whyte, insisted that he and the other 
respondents were employees of the appellants working at the respective 
hourly rates of $7.00 and $4.00 per hour and that appellants were 
aware of the hourly rate of respondents' labor by virtue of billings to 
appellants in the substantial form of Exhibits P-l and P-2 (R-51, 52, 
53, and 54). Yet, when respondent, David Whyte, was cross examined 
concerning Exhibits P-l and P-2, he admitted that each of these exhibits 
came into existence just three weeks before trial (R-51 and 54). 
It is submitted that in keeping with the definition of a 
contractor as set forth in 58-23-3 (3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended, and in keeping with the criteria for determining the 
distinction between a servant and an independent contractor as set forth 
in Cristean vs» Industrial Commission, 113 Utah 451, 196 Pa 2d 502, 
the trial court should have determined that respondent, David Whyte, 
was a contractor and directed a verdict in favor of appellants. 
POINT II 
THE DECISION OF THE JURY WAS NOT IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE EVIDENCE. 
-8-
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Viewing the evidence presented in a light most favorable to 
the respondents, is there evidence to sustain the finding of the jury 
that respondent, David Whyte, was a mere employee of appellant, Deri 
Christensen? 
It would seem that the record is clear that appellants made 
known to respondent, David Whyte, what was wanted in the way of an 
addition to their home and then turned respondent, David Whyte, loose 
to obtain the overall result desired by them. 
Did not respondent, David Whyte, hire all of those who were 
paid for furnishing services or labor to complete the addition to 
appellants1 home? 
Did not respondent, David Whyte, make the selection as to 
where materials were to be purchased and what materials were to be used 
in the building of the addition to appellants' home? 
Is there any evidence in the record of any bill for payment of 
materials, services or labor that did not go first to the respondent, 
David Whyte, and which was then passed on by him to appellant, Deri 
Christensen? 
Was there a preponderance of the evidence that respondents 
were hired at a definite hourly rate agreed upon by respondent, David 
Whyte, and appellant, Deri Christensen? Respondent, David Whyte, claimed 
that Exhibits P-l and P-2 spelled out the rate of hourly pay that 
made respondents the employees of appellants. But, appellants could 
not have been aware of Exhibits P-l and P-2 for the reason they were 
admittedly prepared by respondent, David Whyte, in anticipation of 
trial (R-51, 52, 53 and 54). The first billing to appellants for 
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labor and materials was presented to appellant, Deri Christensen, by 
respondent, David Whyte, in the form of Exhibit D-4 (R-131). It should 
be noted that there was a $100.00 discrepancy in the amount which 
respondent, David Whyte, claimed his records showed as a first payment 
and the billing to appellants as evidenced by Exhibit D-4. No dispute 
existed that respondent, David Whyte, received $1,609.36 the second time 
appellants were billed for payment (Exhibit P-l and D-5). But Exhibit 
D-5, prepared in the handwriting of respondent, David Whyte (R-117) 
shows a lump sum of $532.00 for labor as opposed to the breakdown of 
$488.00 on Exhibit P-l. It would clearly seem that, in contemplation of 
trial, respondent, David Whyte, through Exhibits P-l and P-2, was 
attempting to "force" (Emphasis added) entries that would substantiate 
his claim to being an employee rather than a contractor in this case. 
* 
And the final billing by respondent, David Whyte, to appellant, Deri 
Christensen, as evidenced by Exhibit D-6, showed a lump sum amount for 
the labor of respondents rather than a specific number of hours at a 
definite dollar amount. 
It would seem to go without saying that the jury did not consider 
the evidence in arriving at its decision in that $811.60 was awarded for 
materials furnished by respondent, David Whyte; $734.50 was awarded for 
hours of labor performed by respondent, David Whyte, but not paid for; 
$32 5.50 was awarded for hours of labor performed by respondent, Terry 
Whyte, but not paid for; $224.25 was awarded for hours of labor performed 
by respondent, Dan E. Whyte, but not paid for; and $55.00 was awarded for 
hours of labor performed by respondent, David B. Whyte, but not paid for. 
The trial judge, after dismissal of the jury, made a correction of the 
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verdict of the jury which conformed with the judgment finally entered. 
POINT III . 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN GIVEN IN THAT IT WAS CONFUSING 
TO THE JURY AND PREJUDICIAL TO THE 
APPELLANT. 
The gist of this case being a question of whether respondent, David 
Whyte, was a contractor or an employee and whether appellant, Deri Christen-
sen was an employer of respondent, David Whyte, and there being no 
contractor involved in the construction of the addition to appellants1 
home, Instruction No. 5 as given by the trial court was framed in such 
a way as to be confusing to the jury and prejudicial to the appellants. 
It will be noted that each of the four "important 'tests1' (Emphasis 
added), with the exception of test number three (3) is couched in the 
language nDid the defendant have the right11 (Emphasis added). Where 
the defendant (appellant here), Deri Christensen, was the property owner, 
it goes without saying that he did have all of the rights referred to 
in Instruction No. 5 from the mere fact that he was in control of the 
property where the home addition was being made. The question would seem • 
to be then what actual active part did appellant, Deri Christensen, have 
in the construction of the addition to his home as opposed to what his 
"right" (Emphasis added) was. 
Then, further, Instruction No. 5 does not give the jury any 
direction as to determining in what instance in each of the four tests 
enumerated the respondent, David Whyte, would be considered to be a 
contractor or would be considered to be an employee of the appellant, 
Deri Christensen, and in what instance in each of the four tests enumerated 
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the appellant, Deri Christensen, TOuld be considered to be the employer 
of respondent, David Whyte. 
With the possible exception of test three (3) as enumerated in 
Instruction No. 5, the jury could not have come to any other determination 
than that the appellant, Deri Christensen, was calling the shots in the 
construction of the addition to his home, and thus the employer of 
respondent, David Whyte, and the responsible party in effecting the 
construction of the addition to his home. The language of Instruction No. 
5 clearly put appellant, Deri Christensen, in the position of being between 
a rock and a hard spot, and a position of prejudice to him. 
CONCLUSION 
Upon the record of this case and the statutes and authorities 
cited herein, it should be determined that respondent, Dayid Whyte, was 
not an employee of appellant, Deri Christensen, but that he (respondent, 
David Whyte) was hired as a contractor by appellant, Deri Christensen, 
to construct the addition to appellants' home, and that because respondent, 
David Whyte, had no contractor's license, the respondents are entitled to 
no recovery from the appellants. The verdict of the jury should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BLACKHAM AND BOLEY 
Don Blackham and Mikel M. Boley 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
3535 South 3200 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
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